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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS POST
WEBSTER - BROADER PROTECTION AGAINST
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS?
MARTHA M. EZZARD*
The [Supreme] Court has made it clear that the states, not the federal
government, are the final guarantors of personal privacy .... I
Last October 5, the Florida Supreme Court struck down certain
state legislative restrictions on abortion as unconstitutional under Flor-
ida's express state constitutional privacy guarantee. 2 The decision was a
significant response to the controversial United States Supreme Court
ruling in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 3 handed down just three
months earlier. Webster sent a message to legislatures around the coun-
try that additional state restrictions on abortion are now acceptable 4 be-
cause of the Court's new and narrow interpretation of Roe v. Wade.
5
As a result of the Webster decision, five states passed laws in 1989-90
restricting the abortion decisions of pregnant minors 6 and a variety of
restrictive abortion bills were introduced in twenty-six state legislatures
this year. 7 Leaving the scope of abortion rights to the states, however,
* Fellow, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado College of Law.
A.B.J. 1960, University of Georgia; M.A. 1968, University of Missouri; J.D. 1982, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law. Member, Colorado State Senate, 1980-87. The author
gratefully acknowledges the suggestions and criticism of Pamela A. Gagel, staff attorney
with Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver, CO.
1. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989).
2. See infra note 102.
3. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
4. "[A] plurality of this court implicitly invites every state legislature to enact more
and more restrictive abortion regulations .... ".109 S. Ct. at 3067. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Four states enacted statutes in 1989 requiring minors to obtain parental consent
prior to obtaining an abortion: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (1989)); Maine
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (Supp. 1989)); Pennsylvania (PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 3201-06 (Purdon Supp. 1989)); and Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. § 35 (Supp. 1989)).
South Carolina's consent law, HB 3122, originally introduced in 1989 and signed into law
on February 28, 1990, becomes effective April, 1990. (1990 S.C. ACTS 341, amending 44
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41 (1976, as amended).
7. According to the Legislative Information Service of the National Council of State
Legislatures, legislative proposals requiring parental consent or notification prior to per-
forming an abortion on a minor are pending this year in eleven states, and a variety of bills
relating to abortion (pro and con) have been introduced in twenty-six state legislatures.
Additionally, pro-life activists in Colorado and Oregon have launched petition drives for
the 1990 election to add parental consent laws similar to those enacted by other states
during 1989-90. The proposed Colorado initiative would amend CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12
(1973) by adding a new article 37.5 to be known as the "Colorado Parental Notification
Act."
On February 22, 1990, the Virginia legislature defeated a parental notification bill
(HB 1119) and, on that same date, an Indiana bill codifying a policy statement that life
begins at conception (HB 1034) was also defeated. On February 23, 1990, the governor of
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could eventually backfire on the conservative Webster Court. In re T. W ,8
a recent Florida Supreme Court decision, indicates that express privacy
guarantees in state constitutions may thwart efforts of anti-abortion leg-
islators in some states. The Florida court stated that "[sitate constitu-
tions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal law." 9 In addition to Florida, a California Court of Appeals
decision confirms the effectiveness of state constitutional privacy provi-
sions which ensure that the individually-affected woman, and not the
state, will decide whether a pregnancy should be terminated.10 In Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics v. Van DeKamp,I I the court upheld an injunction
preventing implementation of state legislation restricting the abortion
rights of minors and stated that "in California the question of whether
an individual woman should or should not end her pregnancy is not a
matter that may be put to [a] vote of the legislature."' 2 The California
court found the state constitutional privacy guarantee requires a show-
ing of a "compelling state interest" to invade the privacy right of a mi-
nor. Without such state constitutional protection, the lesser federal test
of a "significant state interest" would have most likely been applied to
the invasion of a minor's privacy interest. 13 Thus, the danger of failing
to provide state constitutional protection is that under the lesser federal
test more state intrusion into the decision to terminate a pregnancy, as
seen in Webster, may be permissible.
In Webster, the Court upheld a Missouri law (1) requiring physicians
Michigan vetoed a parental consent bill (HB 5103) and Idaho's governor, Cecil Andrus,
refused to sign perhaps the most restrictive abortion bill in the United States on March 30,
1990. (The Idaho proposal prohibited abortions except in cases of rape, incest, severe
fetal deformity, or threat to the life of the mother.)
The territory of Guam enacted a new abortion law, effective March 19, 1990, which
prohibits all abortions unless the pregnancy endangers the mother's life. (PL 20-134
(1990), amending GUAM Govr CODE §§ 9 and 10 (1970)). This law has already been chal-
lenged in federal district court by the American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Free-
dom Project. A restraining order blocking its enforcement was issued March 24, 1990.
(N.Y. Times, March 25, 1990, § 1, at 16, col. 3-4).
8. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
9. 551 So. 2d at 1191 (quoting Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndivid-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977)).
10. Colorado's pro-choice coalition met several times during March, 1990, to discuss
the possibility of a petition drive for a state constitutional privacy right or other initiative
to guarantee abortion rights, tentatively for the 1992 ballot. If the coalition decides to
launch such an initiative, Colorado would likely be the first state in the nation to vote on a
state constitutional privacy guarantee, post Webster. (Interview with Tina Proctor, Execu-
tive Director, Colorado Planned Parenthood, Denver, on March 19, 1990.)
HB 3945, introduced February 8, 1990 in the Maine legislature, would amend the
Maine Constitution to guarantee that each individual shall have "the fundamental right to
make his or her own reproductive decisions." Two other states, New Hampshire and
Ohio, are also considering proposed state statutes to guarantee that a woman's right to
bear a child is a "fundamental right of privacy" and to prohibit governmental interference
with that right. See Ohio SB 275, introduced Nov. 9, 1989, and New Hampshire HB 1424,
introduced January 10, 1990.
II. 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989).
12. 263 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
13. Id. at 46.
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to conduct viability tests prior to performing abortions;14 (2) prohibit-
ing the use of public facilities or employees to perform abortions; and
(3) prohibiting public funding for abortion counseling. Additionally,
the Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the preamble to
Missouri's law (which declares that life begins at conception) 15 stating
that the preamble was not being applied to restrict the Webster plaintiffs'
activities in any concrete way.'
6
Although the Webster plaintiffs protested the Missouri statute's inva-
sion of the privacy rights of pregnant women seeking abortions, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, avoided discussion of the
federal constitutional right to privacy which was the underpinning of Roe
v. Wade. 1 7 In Roe, the Court drew on a series of historic decisions inter-
preting the right to privacy as a penumbral right of the fourteenth
amendment's liberty guarantee and concluded:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as
far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, (1891),
the Court has recognized that a right to personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution . . . . This right to privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined in the Ninth Amendment's reser-
vation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 18
Thus, the Roe Court held Texas' law prohibiting abortion was
unconstitutional.
In the post-Webster Florida decision, In re T. W., as well as in the re-
cent California decision of American Academy of Pediatrics, the traditional
federal rule that a state may adopt in its own constitution individual lib-
erties more expansive than those conferred by the federal Constitution
has been confirmed. 19 Ten states have express privacy guarantees writ-
ten into their constitutions. 20 In many instances, state high courts have
construed state guarantees of privacy, also known as "the right to be let
14. Missouri's law requires a physician, before performing an abortion on a woman he
has reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of 20 weeks or more, to determine if the
unborn child is viable by using "that degree of care, skill and proficiency commonly exer-
cised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician engaged in similar practice
under the same or similar conditions." (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.029 (Supp. 1989)).
15. But see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983)("[A] State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of
abortions."). In Akron, an ordinance containing essentially the same language as the pre-
amble language in lWebster, was held unconstitutional based upon dicta in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973).
16. lWebster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
17. 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973).
18. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
19. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
20. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 23: HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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alone,"'2 1 as assuring their citizens a broad protection from government
intrusion in their private lives. For example, state constitutional equal
rights amendments ("ERA") have provided stronger protection for wo-
men than the federal law in state discrimination cases. 2 2 In the face of
failure of a proposed federal ERA and the refusal of the U.S. Supreme
Court to review sex discrimination cases with the same strict scrutiny it
applies to race discrimination cases, state ERAs have effectively pre-
served equal rights for women. 2 3 Similarly, state constitutional privacy
guarantees can be expected to defend against greater restrictions on
abortion which will continue to be proposed by state legislatures in the
post-Webster period.
This comment briefly reviews the origin and scope of the penum-
bral federal right to privacy and examines state courts' construction of
express state constitutional privacy guarantees. The comment also re-
views cases where other express state constitutional liberty protections
were held to be more expansive than similar federal guarantees, and
then analogizes the application of these cases to the abortion decision.
A discussion of the Supreme Court's contrasting treatment of the right
to privacy in Roe and Webster is followed by an analysis of the landmark
post-Webster Florida decision, In re T. W.. The relationship of this case to
two pending U.S. Supreme Court abortion cases involving the privacy
rights of minors is also discussed.24 In the conclusion, some elements
useful in constructing state "model" constitutional privacy amendments
are suggested.
THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY HAD ITS ORIGIN IN THE PROTECTION OF
FAMILY AND REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS
One of the earliest American cases finding an invasion of personal
privacy impermissible involved an unreasonable intrusion into a wo-
man's physical seclusion at childbirth. In 1881, the Michigan Supreme
Court in De May v. Roberts2 5 found a mother's privacy was invaded when
a physician brought an unnamed man, "a stranger.., utterly ignorant of
the practice of medicine," ' 26 to assist in delivering the baby. "To the
plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one, and no one had a right to
intrude unless invited or because of some real and pressing necessity
which it is not pretended existed in this case."' 27 This decision shows
21. "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion .... " FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
23. See text accompanying notes 95-99 for a discussion regarding Colorado Civil
Rights v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988).
24. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ohio, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988),prob.
juris. noted, 110 S. Ct. 39 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 400 (1989). The Court also agreed to hear a third case from Illi-
nois. However, the parties settled the case. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th
Cir. 1988), consideration of jurisdiction postponed until hearing on the merits, 109 S. Ct. 3239
(1989),further proceedings deferred, 110 S. Ct. 532.
25. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
26. 9 N.W. at 146.
27. Id. at 149.
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that though early privacy cases were not based on an invasion of consti-
tutional rights, personal privacy as a legally protected interest was con-
sistently supported by American courts.
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published in the
Harvard Law Review their now famous article entitled "The Right to Pri-
vacy." 28 In it, they argued for recognition of a broad right to privacy.
Slowly, four kinds of invasion of privacy interests evolved in the law. All
of the concepts centered on the idea that everyone has "the right to be
let alone." '29 In 1891, the Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford3 ° upheld a lower court decision refusing to order a female
plaintiff to submit, against her wishes, to an examination of her injuries.
The plaintiff sued the railway company for injuries she suffered when an
upper berth in the sleeping car fell on her. In affirming the decision for
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court declared almost one hundred years ago
that every individual has the right to control his or her body:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law.
3 1
Perhaps the most eloquent description of the right to privacy under the
federal Constitution was written in 1928 by U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
3 2
The makers of our Constitution... recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect....
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
man.
3 3
Despite Justice Brandeis' recognition of a privacy right long before,
it was not until the 1950s, when the Supreme Court raised questions
about improper personal intrusions by government officials in criminal
cases, that a constitutional right to privacy began to be discussed seri-
ously again.3 4 The landmark case establishing such a constitutional pri-
vacy right outside the criminal area was a 1965 case involving marital
28. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
29. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117
(5th ed. 1984)(Discussion regarding four types of privacy invasions: (1) appropriation of a
name or likeness; (2) unreasonable intrusion of a private interest; (3) public disclosure of
private facts; and (4) the "zone of privacy" based on the federal constitutional right.).
30. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
31. Id. at 251.
32. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
33. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Supreme Court refused to overturn
the conviction of Dr. Wolf, a Colorado obstetrician, for conspiracy to commit abortion
despite the unreasonable search and seizure of Wolf's private patient medical records, in
violation of the fourth amendment.
1990]
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and reproductive decisions. In Griswold v. Connecticut,3 5 a Connecticut
statute which prohibited physicians from dispensing contraceptive infor-
mation was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because it
deprived couples of their right to marital privacy. This privacy right,
although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is protected as a
penumbral right to the liberty guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The
Court said, "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."'3 6 The Court referred to previous decisions 3 7 creating
penumbral rights to the Bill of Rights and noted that the ninth amend-
ment ensures that certain fundamental rights, additional to those specifi-
cally mentioned in the Constitution, are protected from governmental
infringement.3 8 Finding the marriage relationship within a constitution-
ally protected "zone of privacy," the Court said:
The present case ... concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees .... Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of pri-
vacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
39
The Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Eisenstadt v. Baird de-
clared that single individuals as well as married persons should be free
of governmental intrusion in decisions as "fundamental" as whether to
bear a child. 40 The 1972 Eisenstadt decision declared invalid, on the ba-
sis of privacy and equal protection, a Massachusetts statute which per-
mitted married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy
but prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. De-
fendant William Baird was convicted under the Massachusetts statute for
giving a young single woman a contraceptive following a lecture on con-
traception which he delivered to a group of Boston College students.
The Court found the Massachusetts law to be an unconstitutional intru-
sion of a single woman's private decision, and neither its claimed health
attributes nor its possible deterrence of premarital sex was a sufficiently
"compelling" state interest to justify it. 4 1
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions upheld the fundamental
constitutional nature of a woman's decision concerning pregnancy as
the political, legal and moral debate over abortion continued during the
1970s and into the 1980s. 42 In its 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade,4 3 the
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484.
37. Prior to Griswold, the first amendment was interpreted to guarantee the right to
free association, N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right to
educate children in schools of parents' choice, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); and the right to study any foreign language, Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 39 (1923).
38. 381 U.S. at 484.
39. 381 U.S. at 484-86.
40. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
41. Id. at 443.
42. Decisions subsequent to Eisenstadt recognizing a woman's right to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion regarding the abortion decision include Thornburgh
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Court determined that the right of privacy, whether founded in the four-
teenth or ninth amendment, was certainly broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy. 44 Then in the
1986 decision Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, Justice Black-
mun wrote of a woman's fundamental right to choice:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies
a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government. . . . That
promise extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions
are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's
decision - with the guidance of her physician and within the
limits specified by Roe - whether to end her pregnancy. A wo-
man's right to make that choice freely is fundamental.
4 5
FROM ROE TO WEBSTER: THE SUPREME COURT ABANDONS THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY IN THE ABORTION DECISION
The 1973 landmark Roe decision which struck down Texas' statu-
tory prohibition against abortion was based on the pregnant woman's
constitutional right to privacy. The Roe court pointed to the traditional
application of that fundamental right to activities relating to marriage,
procreation and family relationships. 4 6 In the majority opinion, Justice
Blackmun developed a detailed analysis of the privacy right as related to
abortion, acknowledging that in the abortion decision the privacy right
cannot be absolute: "The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her
privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus. . . . The situation
therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom pos-
session of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education
"47
Distinguishing the privacy right in the abortion decision from that
in other personal and family decisions, the Court said the woman's pri-
vacy right is no longer "absolute" at the point in her pregnancy when
legitimate interests of the state in maternal health and potential life be-
come dominant. 4 8 Where certain fundamental rights are involved, a
regulation limiting those rights is justified only if the state can show a
compelling interest. The Court said that those state interests are not
compelling, however, in the first trimester, when the abortion decision
should be a private one between a woman and her physician. 49 In his
v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Id. at 153.
45. 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
46. 410 U.S. 113 at 152-53. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
47. 410 U.S. at 159.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 164.
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concurring opinion in Roe, Justice Stewart cited the history of the
Court's protection of privacy as embodied in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. He then quoted from Abele v. Markle,50 a
1972 decision in which the Connecticut district court struck down a stat-
ute prohibiting all abortions except to save a mother's life:
Certainly the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and
emotional self during pregnancy and the interests that will be
affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a child
are of far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy
than the right to send a child to private school ... or the right
to teach a foreign language . . .51
The strong reliance of the Court in Roe on the fundamental right to
privacy is in stark contrast to the lack of any substantive discussion of
that right in Webster. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe, denying
any relationship of a privacy right to the abortion decision, was a harbin-
ger of the plurality opinion he authored in Webster. "I have difficulty in
concluding," he wrote in his Roe dissent, "that the right of 'privacy' is
involved in this case."
'52
The Court in Webster addressed the constitutionality of five sections
of a Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions. The only
mention in the plurality opinion of the right to privacy, however, was a
brief statement in defense of not dealing with the issue:
The dissent takes us to task for our failure to join in a "great
issues" debate as to whether the Constitution includes an
"unenumerated" general right to privacy as recognized in cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut . . . and Roe. But Griswold v. Con-
necticut, unlike Roe, did not purport to adopt a whole frame-
work, complete with detailed rules and distinctions, to govern
the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply. As
such, it was far different from the opinion . . . of Roe v. Wade,
which sought to establish a constitutional framework for judg-
ing state regulation of abortion during the entire term of
pregnancy.
53
In a scathing dissent, Justice Blackmun accused the plurality of fo-
cusing superficially on the trimester framework (which he described as
merely a "judge-made method" 54 for balancing rights), instead of the
substantive constitutional issue itself:
The plurality does not even mention, much less join the true
jurisprudential debate underlying this case: whether the Con-
stitution includes an "unenumerated" general right to privacy
as recognized in many of our decisions . . . and, more specifi-
cally, whether and to what extent such a right of privacy ex-
tends to matters of childbearing and family life, including
50. 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
51. 410 U.S. at 170.
52. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989).
54. Id. at 3073 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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abortion. 55
While concurring with the judgment of the plurality Justice Scalia,
who forthrightly favored overturning Roe, admitted that it is still "an
arguable question" whether or not abortions can be "constitutionally
proscribed." 56 Scalia was critical of the plurality for refusing in Webster
to reexamine Roe. The arguable question to which Scalia referred is,
presumably, the scope of the individual privacy right when balanced
against the interest of the state in protecting potential life. Clearly,
given the varied viewpoints expressed by the Court, state cases explor-
ing the boundaries of Webster were inevitable.
IN RE T. W.: THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION'S EXPRESS PRIVACY RIGHT
MANDATES A STATE SHOWING OF COMPELLING INTEREST
In In re T. W, the first abortion ruling in the country following Web-
ster, the Florida Supreme Court declared Florida's statute requiring pa-
rental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion unconstitutional on the
basis of the Florida Constitution's express privacy right:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit
the public's right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law.
5 7
The October 5, 1989 decision makes it clear that Florida's constitutional
privacy right provides greater individual liberty protection to the state's
citizens than does the federal Constitution.
T.W., a 15-year-old unmarried pregnant minor petitioned for a
waiver of parental consent under the Florida statute's judicial bypass
provision, which required a showing that the minor is "sufficiently ma-
ture to give an informed consent" or that a parent or guardian "unrea-
sonably withheld consent" or that a minor feared "physical or emotional
abuse" if her parent was "requested to consent." 5 8 Counsel for T.W.
produced evidence that T.W. was "mature"; that she had taken sex edu-
cation and had viewed an instructional film on abortion; that she was
active in school activities and planned to go to vocational school after
high school; that she worked twenty hours a week and babysat for her
mother, who was seriously ill. T.W. testified that if she had to tell her
mother about her pregnancy, she believed "it would kill her." 5 9
The Florida Supreme Court, because of Florida's state privacy guar-
antee, opted to examine the consent law first under the state constitu-
tion. Because the Florida high court found the statute in violation of the
state privacy right, it declared no further analysis under federal law was
55. Id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989)(quoting FuA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
58. FLA. STAT. § 3 90.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
59. 551 So. 2d at 1189.
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required. 60 The analysis under the state's express privacy provision was
clearly more stringent than would have been required by federal law
alone:
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and
enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution which ex-
pressly and succinctly provides for a strong right of privacy not
found in the United States Constitution, it can only be con-
cluded that the right is much broader in scope than that of the
Federal Constitution.
6 1
Establishing first that the privacy right in the Florida Constitution
extends to minors, 6 2 the Florida Supreme Court said, despite the state's
interest in the protection of minors, the state constitution's privacy guar-
antee requires a "compelling" state interest to permit state intrusion.
63
The U.S. Supreme Court said, in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., that under the United States Constitution state intrusion of
a minor's privacy in an abortion decision requires only a showing of a
"significant" or "substantial" state interest. 64 The more stringent test
under the Florida Constitution requires (1) that the statute further a
compelling state interest; and (2) that the state interest is furthered
through the least intrusive means.6 5 Although the court in In re T W,
recognized additional state interests in cases involving minors - protec-
tion of the immature minor and preservation of the family unit - the
court found neither sufficiently compelling to override Florida's strong
privacy guarantee. 66 Because the Florida statute made no provision for
appointment of a lawyer for the minor or for a record hearing in the
bypass procedure, the court said the statutory requirement was not "the
least intrusive means" of furthering the state's interests. 6 7 Accordingly,
the Florida statute was struck down as unconstitutional under state law.
Two guidelines for spousal/parental notification or consent statutes
to pass federal constitutional muster have already been established by
the Supreme Court: (1) the state cannot give a third party absolute veto
power over the decision of a physician and patient to terminate a preg-
60. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 ("We expressly decide this case on state law
grounds and cite federal precedent only to the extent that it illuminates Florida law.").
61. Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d
544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
62. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)("Consti-
tutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority.").
63. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,
477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985)("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we
believe demands the compelling state interest standard.").
64. 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983) ("The Court has repeatedly recognized that, in
view of the unique status of children under the law, the states have a 'significant' interest in
certain abortion regulations aimed at protecting children .... ").
65. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193. See also American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van
DeKamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989)("In keeping with the [constitu-
tional] language of art. 1, section 1, we hold that the status of the person involved does not
determine the test to be used. The test remains whether the burden on the privacy right is
justified by a compelling state interest.").
66. 551 So. 2d at 1194.
67. Id. at 1195-96.
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nancy;68 and (2) if a state requires a pregnant woman to obtain parental
consent, the state must also provide a bypass or alternative authorizing
procedure. 6 9 Interestingly, two abortion cases being considered by the
U.S. Supreme Court during its current term involve parental notification
statutes. 70 Although these cases are not likely to provide an opportunity
for the Court to overturn Roe, they could force the Court to address the
extent of a minor's privacy interest.
In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ohio, 7 1 the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed a federal district court ruling that an Ohio parental notification
statute was unconstitutional because the state's bypass procedure was
unduly burdensome and interfered with a minor's fundamental privacy
right. However, in another parental notification case, Hodgson v. State of
Minnesota,72 the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc reversed a panel decision
and decided that a Minnesota statute requiring 48-hour notice of both
parents by a pregnant minor seeking an abortion was constitutional. The
Minnesota statute contains a judicial bypass procedure for an individual
pregnant minor to avoid parental notification if she can show she is ma-
ture and that parental notification is not in her best interest, but it con-
tains no exception to notification of both parents even if one parent has
deserted the minor or is not a custodial parent. Nonetheless, the Eighth
Circuit said the statute protects the state's "significant" interest in the
minor's physical, mental and emotional well-being and that the bypass
procedure meets the constitutional requirements. Only in the dissent is
the minor's right to privacy mentioned.
7 3
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re T W. is not likely to
have an effect on the outcome of Akron or Hodgson, since neither Ohio
nor Minnesota has an express state constitutional privacy guarantee.
Therefore, the test of whether the state's interest in protecting the mi-
nor outweighs the minor's privacy rights will likely be whether the inter-
est is "significant" or "substantial," rather than the more stringent
"compelling" interest requirement applied by the Florida Supreme
Court pursuant to the state's express privacy guarantee. 74 Under this
68. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
70. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ohio, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988),prob.
juris. noted, 110 S. Ct. 39 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 400 (1989).
71. 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), prob. juris. noted, 110 S. Ct. 39 (1989).
72. 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 400 (1989).
73. "As the district court found: '. . . The vast majority of these voluntarily informed
parents are women who are divorced or separated from spouses whom they have not seen
in years. Going to court to avoid notifying the other parent burdens the privacy of both
the minor and the accompanying parent.' ". Id. at 1468 (Lay, Chief Judge, dissenting).
74. But see Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 956 (D. Colo. 1975). In striking
down Colorado's abortion statute requiring parental consent, the federal district court in
this post-Roe decision employed a "compelling" interest standard despite the fact that Col-
orado has no express state constitutional privacy guarantee: "We do not believe that the
state has demonstrated that its interest in fostering parental control is sufficiently compel-
ling to justify the broad and unrestricted intrusion into a minor's own constitutional rights
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test, more interference in the decision to terminate pregnancy, particu-
larly in the case of minors, can be expected.
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS NOT DEPENDENT ON
PRIOR FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT
The independent analysis of the Florida Supreme Court in In re
T W. is no different from that of the California Supreme Court in a 1981
(pre-Webster) decision, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 75 in
which the court declared California's Medi-Cal scheme unconstitutional.
The In re T. W. court, like the California Supreme Court in Myers, relied
not on federal analysis but rather on its own construction of state consti-
tutional guarantees and precedent in protecting the liberty rights of its
citizens.
In defending the constitutionality of the California Medi-Cal provi-
sions (which funded childbirth but not abortion for indigent women),
the State Attorney General cited Harris v. McRae,7 6 a Supreme Court
decision upholding similar federal Medicaid restrictions on abortion
funding. But the California Supreme Court rejected the U.S. Supreme
Court analysis and said the California Constitution and California
caselaw mandated a substantially different test to sustain the constitu-
tionality of the scheme under the California Constitution's express right
to privacy: "All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and lib-
erty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
'7 7
The California Court of Appeals in American Academy of Pediatrics con-
firmed in its decision last fall the independent force of the express right
to privacy in the California Constitution, a right "broader than the fed-
eral right to privacy."' 78 A survey of case law in those states whose con-
stitutions contain express privacy rights reveals that the state right to
privacy has served to protect citizens who wanted to expunge juvenile
records, 79 refuse medical life support systems,8 0 prevent psychologist-
patient communications from being revealed in court8 l and bar public
disclosure of certain personal financial information.8 2 In a case decided
principally on the basis of Louisiana's constitutional privacy guarantee,
Arsenaux v. Arsenaux,8 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled against admis-
75. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779 (1981).
76. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
77. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (as amended, 1974).
78. 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 52 (1989).
79. St. Louis v. Drolet, 348 N.E.2d 289 (111. App. 1976), affd, 364 N.E.2d 61 (I1.
1977).
80. See discussion infra of Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re
Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987), recon. denied (July 15, 1988), op.
amended, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988).
81. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1984).
82. Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Comm., 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
83. 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983).
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sion of testimony of an alleged abortion in a divorce suit on the basis of
the Louisiana constitutional guarantee:
[T]here are strong constitutional considerations weighing
against admission of this evidence. The Louisiana Constitution
of 1974 provides in Article 1, § 5, that "[e]very person shall be
secure in his person, property, communications, houses, pa-
pers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or in-
vasions of privacy .... 84
The Louisiana high court said that while the right to privacy is not abso-
lute in the abortion decision, it can only yield to a compelling state inter-
est and, in this case, none had been shown.
The Arizona Supreme Court in 1987 interpreted that state's consti-
tutional right to privacy, which guarantees that "no person shall be dis-
turbed in his private affairs," 85 as encompassing an individual's private
right to refuse medical treatment. In Rasmussen v. Fleming,86 the state
supreme court declared that an individual's right to decide his own plan
of medical treatment "deserves as much, if not more, constitutionally-
protected privacy as does an individual's home or automobile." 8 7 The
Washington Supreme Court decided similarly in a controversy involving
a mother's authority, as legal guardian of her terminally ill child, to re-
fuse certain life-sustaining treatment. In In re Guardianship of Grant,8 8 the
state high court recognized that the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment "stems independently from the explicit privacy guarantee in Arti-
cle I, § 7" of the Washington Constitution.89
Although Pennsylvania is not one of the ten states whose constitu-
tions contain an explicitly worded "privacy" guarantee, the Pennsylvania
Constitution has been construed by that state's supreme court as guar-
anteeing such a right. Since the Pennsylvania General Assembly in its
1989 Session responded to Webster by approving one of the most restric-
tive abortion laws in the nation,90 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in In re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury9 l
takes on special significance. The grand jury in this case issued a sub-
poena duces tecum to the hospital administrator seeking production of the
84. Id. at 430.
85. ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
86. 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987).
87. Id. at 682.
88. 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987).
89. Id. at 449 n.1.
90. The Pennsylvania Abortion Act of 1989, approved by the Pennsylvania General
Assembly and signed into law by the Governor on November 17, 1989, requires spousal
notification, documented gestational age of the fetus and detailed written informed con-
sent by the pregnant woman. It prohibits all abortions except to prevent death of the
mother or the "irreversible impairment of a major bodily function" of the mother. Penal-
ties for physicians who violate the law range from suspension of medical license to imposi-
tion of a class three criminal felony penalty if the fetus is "viable." See 1989 Pa. Laws, Act
64 (amending Title 18, Crimes & Offenses, PA. CONS. STAT. § 3201-06 (Purdon Supp.
1989)). This law was recently enjoined by Judge Huyett of the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Harrisburg. See N.Y. Times, jan. 12, 1990, § A, at
18, col. 2 (late ed. final).
91. 415 A.2d 73 (Pa. 1980).
1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
actual tissue reports issued by a private laboratory used by the hospital.
The hospital was being investigated for misuse of public facilities. The
court said that the reports, including the names of patients, were not
covered by the standard physician-patient privilege because they in-
volved no private communication. Nonetheless, the hospital administra-
tor refused to produce the records, arguing that they were private and,
therefore, protected under Pennsylvania's Constitution, and the court
agreed:
Clearly, the privacy interest of the patients.., is the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. This privacy interest
finds explicit protection in the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art.
1, § 1, which provides, in pertinent part: "All men ...have
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those
...of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and repu-
tation (emphasis added) .... 92
The court ordered the records produced, however, noting that both the
secret nature of the grand jury investigation and the ability of the super-
vising judge to preserve the confidentiality of the records at any subse-
quent trial would protect their private nature. It will be interesting to
see whether the new, restrictive Pennsylvania abortion law is challenged
in the future under the state constitutional protection of "reputation"
which has been interpreted as a state right to privacy.
The important principle, which is consistent in state courts' con-
struction of state guaranteed privacy rights, is that state courts are not
dependent on federal analyses of similar federal rights. The California
Supreme Court in People v. Brisendine9 3 noted the historical precedent for
independent state judicial analysis of state constitutional liberty
guarantees:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitu-
tions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to
mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is other-
wise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding pro-
visions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
94
MORE EXPANSIVE STATE LIBERTY RIGHTS MAY BE UPHELD DESPITE
NARROWER FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR RIGHTS
Barring a federal constitutional amendment to prohibit abortion,
the state constitutional right to privacy will continue to protect a wo-
man's decision concerning termination of a pregnancy in the first tri-
mester. The Supreme Court cannot totally turn its back on its historical
precedent of privacy protection under the Constitution, regardless of its
modification or even eventual reversal of Roe. Two cases illustrate the
primacy of state constitutional liberty guarantees when similar federal
rights have either been rejected or more narrowly construed.
92. Id. at 77.
93. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975).
94. 531 P.2d at 1113.
[Vol. 67:3
STATE PRIVACY RIGHTS POST WEBSTER
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Civil Rights Commission v. Travelers
Insurance Co. ,95 declared that the Colorado ERA provides a stronger con-
stitutional guarantee against sex discrimination than federal law. The
state supreme court held that an employer unlawfully discriminated
against a female employee on the basis of sex by providing a group
health policy which excluded from coverage medical expenses associ-
ated with normal pregnancy. The court also found the insurance com-
pany aided and abetted the discriminatory practice. Travelers Insurance
denied the claim of Amy Budde, a secretary employed by a Denver law
firm, for reimbursement of normal pregnancy and childbirth expenses.
The insurance company claimed the firm's group health insurance pol-
icy provided only for any disability or complications resulting from preg-
nancy. 96 The Colorado Court of Appeals overturned a Colorado Civil
Rights Commission ruling in favor of Budde, relying on the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.9 7 The appellate
court reasoned that because the Colorado General Assembly failed to
include in the Colorado statutes the language from the federal Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (the "Act"), the rationale of Gilbert
applied. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, found the Gilbert deci-
sion effectively nullified by the Act.98
Central to the appellate court's Gilbert reasoning was that failure to
include pregnancy benefits in insurance coverage was not discriminatory
because there was no risk from which men were protected and women
were not. But the Colorado Supreme Court in Travelers Insurance Co. re-
versed the court of appeals decision and said the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission rules requiring normal pregnancy and childbirth benefits in
such insurance coverage were consistent with the Colorado ERA:
Reliance on the Gilbert rationale is particularly inappropriate
... in light of the fact that Colorado constitutional provisions
provide additional prohibitions against sex discrimination not
present in the United States Constitution. In 1972, the people
of Colorado adopted as a constitutional amendment Article II,
Section 29 (the Equal Rights Amendment), which provides as
follows:
Equality of the sexes. Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its
political subdivisions on account of sex.99
Despite failure of a federal ERA, the Colorado Supreme Court appropri-
ately relied on the express state constitutional guarantee of equal rights
for women in interpreting Colorado's antidiscrimination statutes.
The United States Supreme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins 10 upheld a California Supreme Court decision10 ' allowing dis-
95. 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988).
96. Id. at 1361.
97. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
98. 759 P.2d at 1362.
99. Id. at 1363.
100. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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tribution of handbills on private shopping center property under Cali-
fornia's freedom of speech guarantee, even though the Supreme Court's
prior decision under the federal Constitution's protection of property
rights was contrary. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,10 2 the Supreme Court said
under the federal Constitution a privately owned shopping center may
prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbil-
ling is not related to the shopping center's operations.' 0 3 But the Court
said the reasoning in Lloyd - that the first amendment to the United
States Constitution does not prevent a private shopping center owner
from prohibiting distribution of handbills 10 4 - does not limit a state in
adopting in its own constitution "individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the federal Constitution."' 1 5 The California
Supreme Court in its earlier decision in Pruneyard 106 said the. protective
provisions of California's first amendment, including its free speech and
press guarantees, are "more definitive and inclusive" than those of the
federal Constitution's first amendment. The California Supreme Court
noted that the framers of California's Constitution "could have adopted
the words of the federal Bill of Rights" but chose not to do so.
10 7
The U.S. Supreme Court, agreeing with the California Supreme
Court's reliance on strong state free speech provisions, concluded that,
absent action amounting to a "taking" of private property, the handbill
distribution was protected by the state constitution. Thus, the state
court's reliance on a stronger state constitutional right, rather than on
U.S. Supreme Court precedent construing similar federally protected
rights, was upheld in Pruneyard by the Supreme Court itself.
CONCLUSION
Proponents and opponents of abortion rights always arrive at an
impasse over the question of when life begins. Who has the right to
decide that question - the state or the individual - goes not only to the
heart of the moral, religious and political debate over abortion, but also
to the fundamental nature of the right to privacy. The Roe Court de-
clared that in the early stages of pregnancy neither the courts nor the
state ought to be the decisionmaker; rather, the individual woman
should make the decision privately concerning whether to terminate her
pregnancy in consultation with her physician.
Despite the tedious discussion in Webster regarding the exact
number of weeks at which the viability of a fetus exists or may be deter-
101. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
102. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
103. Id. at 552.
104. 447 U.S. at 81. The Supreme Court relied on its previous decisions in declaring
that property "does not lose its private character" when the public is invited for desig-
nated purposes.
105. Id.
106. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979).
107. 592 P.2d at 346.
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mined, Webster does not affect a woman's private right to decide to have
an abortion during the first trimester. The plurality opinion in Webster
poses a serious threat, however, to the fundamental nature and scope of
the constitutional right to privacy by simply refusing to deal with the
issue. For example, ChiefJustice Rehnquist raises the crucial question
as to when the state's interest in protecting potential life is compelling,
but then refuses to answer it: "[W]e do not see why the State's interest
in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the
point of viability."' 10 8 The answer, of course, would require either a
confirmation or a rejection of a woman's right to privacy with respect to
her early stages of pregnancy. The Chief Justice admits that the Mis-
souri statute, which the plurality upholds as constitutional, inserts the
state in the woman's previously protected decision prior to the point of
fetal viability. While admitting that such state interference would not be
allowed under Roe, the Webster plurality nonetheless declares the Mis-
souri statute constitutional, without explaining why:
It is true that the tests in question increase the expense of abor-
tion, and regulate the discretion of the physician.... Since the
tests will undoubtedly show in many cases that the fetus is not
viable, the tests will have been performed for what were in fact
second-trimester abortions. But we are satisfied that the re-
quirement of these tests permissibly furthers the State's inter-
est in protecting potential life, and we therefore believe §
188.029 to be constitutional. ' 0 9
Having substantially undermined the Roe balancing of constitu-
tional rights by rejecting, in essence, the trimester scheme, the Webster
plurality substitutes nothing in its place. Chief Justice Rehnquist justi-
fies leaving the important questions concerning constitutionally permis-
sible abortion restrictions to state legislatures by recounting that more
than half the voters who elect state legislators are women:
[T]he [dissent's] suggestion that legislative bodies, in a Nation
where more than half the population is female, will treat this
decision as an invitation to enact abortion laws reminiscent of
the dark ages misreads the decision and does scant justice to
those who serve in such bodies -and the people who elect
them. 1 10
The Chief Justice overlooks the fact, of course, that women still com-
prise less than a fifth of the elected membership of those state legislative
bodies. I I I
In light of the Webster Court's acquiescence to the states on abortion
regulation,' 12 In re T. W, the first state post- Webster abortion decision, is
108. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
109. Id. at 3079.
110. Id. at 3045.
Il1. According to the 1988 Report of the Center for the American Woman and Politics
(National Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics,
Rutgers University) women comprise 16% of the nation's state legislatures.
112. Justice Blackmun wrote in his dissenting opinion in Webster: -[t]he plurality ...
would return to the States virtually unfettered authority to control the quintessentially
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a refreshing reminder of the traditional power of the states in our fed-
eral system to guarantee individual liberty rights to a greater degree
than the federal Constitution or federal case law provide. The decision
is especially significant because of its independent analysis based on
Florida's constitutional right to privacy, which was approved by Florida
voters in 1980.113
Ten existing state constitutions contain privacy guarantees, but of-
fer differing constitutional structure and language. Nevertheless, three
basic elements can be identified which substantially strengthen state
constitutional privacy rights: (1) inclusion of a free-standing privacy
provision; (2) inclusion of a compelling interest test to overcome the
privacy right; and (3) inclusion of a definition of the essential or funda-
mental nature of the privacy right.
The Florida provision is a free-standing section of the state consti-
tution, separate and specific in its language. Three of the ten existing
state constitutional privacy guarantees (South Carolina, Louisiana and
Illinois) are included in standard search and seizure provisions: "Every
person shall be secure . . . against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy.""14 Washington and Arizona have identically
worded privacy guarantees which are coupled with protection from
physical invasion of the home: "No person shall be disturbed in his pri-
vate affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
'i 15
The Hawaii and Alaska provisions are almost identical and are free-
standing guarantees: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed...." Similar to the Montana and Florida
constitutions, the Hawaii provision adds, "without a showing of a com-
pelling state interest," which assures that the state must meet the most
stringent test to interfere with the privacy right of its citizens.i 16 The
State of Montana, which revised its constitution in 1988, added a strong
privacy guarantee requiring a compelling state interest test and assuring
the essential nature of the privacy right: "The right of individual privacy
is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."' 17
The California and Florida constitutional privacy guarantees exhibit
contrasting approaches. On a practical basis, some states might find it
easier and more politically attractive to simply add the words "and pri-
vacy," as California did,' 18 to the standard enumeration in almost every
intimate, personal, and life-directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term ... a plural-
ity of this Court implicitly invites every state legislature to enact more and more restrictive
abortion regulations .... " 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. 551 So. 2d at 1191.
114. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
115. ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
116. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6. SeeJech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp.
714 (D. Haw. 1979) (The Hawaii right to privacy gives parents the right to choose a com-
bined surname for their child.).
117. MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 10.
118. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
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state constitution of the basic right to life, liberty and happiness. The
California approach, however, leaves the courts more latitude in inter-
pretation. Conversely, the more recent Florida amendment specifically
declares that the state must show a "compelling" state interest to over-
come the individual privacy right. The Florida provision combines the
historic Brandeis language, "the right to be let alone,' with an impor-
tant modern-day exception for its public records and public meetings
laws. 119
Finally, states such as Maine and Colorado, where pro-choice activ-
ists are discussing privacy amendments as a defense to additional abor-
tion restrictions, 120  may wish to consider language specifying
procreation decisions or reproductive rights as part of the basic privacy
guarantee. 121
There is little doubt that Webster has weakened the federal right to
privacy by questioning but not totally denying its application to the
abortion decision. During the Webster oral arguments, former Solicitor
General Fried, representing the Justice Department, argued in favor of
the constitutionality of the restrictive Missouri law. "We are not asking
the court to unravel the fabric of privacy rights," he said. "Rather, we
are asking the court to pull this one thread." Frank Susman, represent-
ing Reproductive Health Services, replied, "It has always been my expe-
rience that when I pull a thread, my sleeve falls off."' 122 As In re T W.
shows, an express state constitutional privacy guarantee can provide
strong protection against the federal unraveling of the cherished right to
privacy. For the forty states whose constitutions do not include express
privacy guarantees, a privacy amendment, as exhibited by the recent
Florida decision, could bar legislative attempts to restrict privacy. More
importantly, the enactment of new state constitutional privacy guaran-
tees could offset any further weakening by the federal courts of the fun-
damental nature of the federal right to privacy.
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § I (as amended, 1971).
119. "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This right shall not be
construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meeting as provided by
law." FLA. CONST. art. i, § 23.
120. See supra note 10.
12 1. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 for a discussion of the origin of the fed-
eral right to privacy and its application in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
and Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
122. Oral arguments, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., United States Supreme
Court, April 26, 1989.
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